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INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence J. Myler ("Myler") conceived the idea of a mixed-use Midtown Village 
development ("Midtown Village") in or about 2002 after he and his companies bought 
approximately ten acres of land located on State Street in the heart of Orem. One of 
Myler's companies, Tower Development Services, Inc. ("Tower Development"), 
contracted with Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company ("Ellsworth Paulsen") to build 
the Icon Building in August 2003. When the Icon Building was completed in early 2004, 
Myler moth-balled Midtown Village for several months because he lacked the money or 
plans to undertake further construction. 
Work on the site began again in late 2004 when Myler hired Reynolds Brothers, 
Inc. ("Reynolds Brothers") to excavate an enormous pit. Although he still did not have 
the financial wherewithal to actually build anything, Myler wanted to have excavation 
performed at the site in order to arouse public interest in Midtown Village. More 
particularly, Myler wanted to pre-sell condominiums so that he could convince potential 
construction lenders of Midtown Village's viability. 
Myler succeeded with obtaining a construction loan almost six months after the 
excavation was completed. By that time Midtown Village had changed hands and 
Myler's stake in Midtown Village had shrunk dramatically. As the lead lender for a 
syndicate of dozens of participant banks, Marshall Investments Corporation ("Marshall") 
extended a $42 million loan to the new owner, Midtown Joint Venture, LC ("Midtown 
JV"). Marshall's Construction Deed of Trust (the "Deed of Trust") was recorded against 
Midtown Village on June 17, 2005, approximately six months after any work had been 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
performed on the site. Soon after, Big-D Construction Corporation ("Big-D") was hired 
- the third general contractor to sign onto Midtown Village - and construction of 
Midtown Village itself finally began when Orem issued a building permit in early 
October 2005, some nine months after excavation stopped in early January 2005. 
Marshall assigned its interest in Midtown Village to a related entity known as 
BankFirst. In March 2007, BankFirst increased the construction loan to Midtown JV by 
$20 million to a total of $62 million. When Midtown JV later ran out of money, the 
plaintiff/appellee mechanic's lien claimants (collectively, the "Lien Claimants") sued 
both Marshall and BankFirst.1 The Lien Claimants promptly moved for summary 
judgment on the issue of lien priority. The District Court granted the Lien Claimants' 
motion and ruled that their alleged mechanic's liens, if proven valid, have priority over 
UWB's Deed of Trust. 
The District Court erred in granting summary judgment for a number of reasons. 
First, the District Court misinterpreted the mechanic's lien statute to mean that the mere 
movement of earth amounts to the commencement of construction of a structure or 
1
 BankFirst failed in July 2009 and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") was 
appointed receiver. After several months, FDIC transferred its interest in Midtown 
Village to appellant United Western Bank ("UWB"), and UWB was substituted for 
FDIC. A true and correct copy of the District Court's Order of Substitution is included in 
the attached Appendix "A." Since filing its principal brief herein, UWB failed. FDIC 
was appointed receiver and UWB's interest in Midtown Village was transferred to First-
Citizens Bank & Trust Company ("FCB"). FCB was substituted for UWB in the District 
Court on February 22, 2011. A true and correct copy of the District Court's Order of 
Substitution is also included in the attached Appendix "A." FCB since transferred its 
interest in Midtown Village to Blackstone Financial Group Business Trust 
("Blackstone"). A motion to substitute Blackstone for FCB is currently pending before 
the District Court. Despite the fact that Blackstone is presently the real party in interest, 
for purposes of clarity and consistency, the appellant herein will be referred to as UWB. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
improvement. Second, the District Court inappropriately considered UWB's actual 
knowledge of Reynolds Brothers' excavation work when only constructive notice of the 
commencement of construction work is relevant to the question of lien priority. Finally, 
the District Court misapplied the test for whether the Lien Claimants' post-June 17, 2005 
work relates back to Reynolds Brothers' earlier excavation work for purposes of 
mechanic's lien priority. The District Court's grant of summary judgment should be 
reversed. 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Lien Claimants statement of the applicable standard of review is 
contradictory. On one hand, the Lien Claimants suggest that UWB is responsible for 
marshaling the evidence and demonstrating that the District Court's findings were 
inadequately supported when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
findings. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 1. On the other hand, the Lien Claimants explain 
that UWB's challenge to the District Court's grant of summary judgment presents a 
question of law, which is to be reviewed for correctness, with all facts and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom to be viewed in the light most favorable to UWB. See id., at 
pp. 1-2. 
In fact, UWB was not obliged to marshal evidence. The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that: 
When appealing a district court's grant of summary judgment... the 
appellant has no obligation to marshal the evidence. The marshaling 
obligation only arises after a party challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a jury's verdict or a district court's ruling containing 
specific findings of fact. At the summary judgment stage, the district court 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is not concerned about the sufficiency of any evidence because it does not 
resolve any factual disputes. 
Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^  16 n.6, 70 P.3d 904 
(citations omitted). Rather, "[w]hen reviewing a court's decision to grant summary 
judgment, [appellate courts] examine the court's legal conclusions for correctness." 
Tustian v. Schriever, 2001 UT 84, If 13, 34 P.3d 755 (citation omitted). 
RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The brief filed by the Lien Claimants contains numerous citations to documents 
and deposition testimony not found anywhere in the record. Appellate courts will not 
consider matters not in the record before the trial court. See Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT 
App 263, TI 17, 190 P.3d 497 (citing Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. 
Underwriters, Inc., 380 P.2d 135, 135 (Utah 1963)). For the Court's convenience, 
Appendix "B" hereto consists of a table identifying every instance in which the Lien 
Claimants cite non-record evidence in their "Brief of Appellees." In summary, of the 196 
footnotes contained in the Lien Claimants' brief, 53 of those footnotes - or 27 percent -
cite, describe, or refer to evidence not found in the record. 
The following is a list of instances where the Lien Claimants' "Statement of 
Facts" is either demonstrably incorrect, or includes improper citations to non-record 
evidence (the numbered paragraphs below correspond to the numbered paragraphs of the 
indicated sections of the Lien Claimants' "Statement of Facts"): 
4 
••^mm~~ 
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1. Statement of Facts as to the Excavation. 
1. The Lien Claimants' contention that "[t]he Developer then directed 
Claimants to proceed with certain required excavations for the Main Building" is 
inaccurate. Brief of Appellees, at p. 8. The "Claimants," which the Lien Claimants 
define as all of the Lien Claimants, were not directed to excavate anything. Rather, 
although from the first to the last the general contracts for the construction of Midtown 
Village included excavation work, Myler ignored those agreements in favor of 
contracting exclusively with Reynolds Brothers for excavation work on the Midtown 
Village site. See Standard Form of Design-Build Agreement and General Conditions 
Between Owner and Design-Builder, Appendix C, Deposition Exhibit 18 [R. 5059(A)]; 
Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 
5059(A)]; Deposition of Lawrence J. Myler ("Myler Depo."), 150:15-151:8 [R. 
5059(A)]; letter agreement between Myler and Reynolds Brothers, Deposition Exhibit 62 
[R. 5059(A)]. 
The Lien Claimants' citation of deposition exhibits 181, 182 and 190 in support of 
their paragraph 1 is improper. None of those exhibits are part of the record. 
2. The Lien Claimants' statement that "[t]his massive excavation was the first 
construction work to be performed in connection with the Project" is a legal conclusion, 
not a fact. Brief of Appellees, at p. 9. That excavation occurred is a fact; whether 
excavation is "construction work" sufficient to constitute "the commencement to do work 
. . . on the ground for the structure or improvement" is a legal conclusion. As such, this 
assertion has no place in what purports to be a "Statement of Facts." In any event, the 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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dictionary defines "construct" to mean "make by fitting together; build." Oxford Desk 
Dictionary and Thesaurus, at p. 156 (American ed. 1997). The removal of dirt does not 
fit within that definition. Moreover, the Lien Claimants' own documents do not define 
Reynolds Brothers' excavation work as "construction." Rather, for example, Big-D's 
general contract with Midtown JV describes that work as "earthwork." See Standard 
Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. 
The Lien Claimants cited deposition exhibits 96 and 190 in support of their 
assertions. Neither exhibit is part of the record, however. Similarly, page 115 of the 
transcript of Brett Harris' deposition is not found in the record. 
3. Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in part, that 
"[i]f reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference 
shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected." The Lien Claimants ignored this requirement by referring to 
evidence that a representative of "Equity Title performed a site investigation and then 
completed the Mechanics Lien Risk Analysis form for the Title Company" without also 
noting that UWB moved to strike such evidence pursuant to Rule 411 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. Brief of Appellees, at pp. 9-10; see also Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Strike, pp. 10-11 [R. 4830-31]. The Lien Claimants' evidence that UWB has title 
insurance is wholly inadmissible and it was improper for the District Court to admit and 
consider such evidence. 
Not only did the Lien Claimants ignore Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Rule 411 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, but again they cited evidence not 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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found in the record. Specifically, the Lien Claimants cited deposition exhibits 96 and 
165, neither of which is in the record. 
4. The Lien Claimants appear to cite UWB's response to a request for 
admission as support for their claim that a portion of the proceeds of UWB's construction 
loan to Midtown JV was used to pay for excavation work. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 
10. They do so, however, after first noting that UWB objected to the request for 
admission and without indicating where in the record the referenced admission may be 
found. The District Court has never ruled on UWB's objection. In any event, were 
UWB's response found anywhere in the record, the Lien Claimants should have provided 
an appropriate citation. The Lien Claimants also cite deposition exhibit 190, which is not 
part of the record. 
5. As support for the last sentence of paragraph 5, which suggests that 
excavation work was referenced in UWB's loan documents, the Lien Claimants cite 
deposition exhibit 190 and page 102 of the transcript of Jim Krumm's deposition. See 
Brief of Appellees, at p. 10 n.18. Neither deposition exhibit 190 nor page 102 of the 
transcript of Jim Krumm's deposition is part of the record. There is thus no support for 
the Lien Claimants' contention. 
II. Statement of Facts that the Project was Not Materially Abandoned. 
1. As support for their claim that "[t]here was no material change in the 
owner," the Lien Claimants cite two exhibits to the reply memorandum submitted in 
support of their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Brief of Appellees, at p. 11. 
Those exhibits purport to be a pair of development agreements between the City of Orem 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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and a number of other entities. The Lien Claimants did not authenticate either agreement. 
Even if they had, however, neither agreement says anything at all about entity ownership 
or who the "contact person" for any entity is or was. In any event, the Lien Claimants are 
mistaken about ownership of Midtown Village. The property was originally acquired and 
held by Myler's company, Western Oasis Properties, LC ("Western Oasis"). See Snyder 
Decl., fflj 5, 10-12 [R. 4969-70]; Myler Depo., 153:16-154:20 [R. 5059(A)]. Western 
Oasis later transferred the property to Tower Development, which was also owned by 
Myler. See Snyder Decl., ffl[ 15-17 [R. 4968-69]; Myler Depo., 154:5-25 [R. 5059(A)]. 
Myler was unable to obtain financing to build Midtown Village until he formed Midtown 
JV with Jerry C. Moyes ("Moyes") and caused Tower Development to convey the 
property to Midtown JV. See Snyder Decl., ffi[ 18-19 [R- 4968]; Myler Depo., 23:16-
24:6, 155:3-156:20 [R. 5059(A)]. Myler owned only 25 percent of Midtown JV. See id., 
155:3-157:10 [R. 5059(A)]. In summary, no fewer than three separate entities owned 
Midtown Village at various times and Myler's interest in Midtown Village decreased 
from effectively 100 percent when he conceived the idea of Midtown Village to only 25 
percent by the time construction began. The Lien Claimants' contention that ownership 
of Midtown Village never materially changed is thus inaccurate. 
2. The Lien Claimants cite seven deposition exhibits and deposition testimony 
given by Jim Krumm in support of their assertion that "[t]here was no change in the 
lender." Brief of Appellees, at p. 11. Only one of the cited exhibits is part of the record 
(i.e., deposition exhibit 155). That lone exhibit is a Confidential Information 
Memorandum produced by The Marshall Group (an entity related to Marshall, the 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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original construction lender). While the Confidential Information Memorandum clearly 
shows that The Marshall Group contemplated making a loan to Midtown JV at a point in 
time, it offers no support for the Lien Claimants' contention that "Marshall and BankFirst 
was the lender [sic] that worked with the Developer from July of 2004 until BankFirst 
funded the loan in June of 2005." Id. 
3. Once again, most of the evidence the Lien Claimants cite in support of their 
claim that UWB's predecessor did not abandon its effort to finance Midtown Village is 
not found anywhere in the record. See Brief of Appellees, at pp. 11-12. Indeed, only one 
(i.e., deposition exhibit 153) of the nine deposition exhibits cited by the Lien Claimants is 
actually part of the record. 
4. The Lien Claimants contend in paragraph 4 that the same architect and 
general contractor were always involved in Midtown Village. First, fully one-third of the 
deposition exhibits cited by the Lien Claimants in support of this paragraph are not found 
in the record. Specifically, deposition exhibits 181 and 193 are not in the record. Page 
91 of the transcript of Allen Washburn's deposition is also not in the record. Second, 
Ellsworth Paulsen's involvement in Midtown Village was far from consistent. Ellsworth 
Paulsen was hired to build Midtown Village but lacked the bonding capacity necessary to 
undertake construction alone. See Washburn Depo., 19:23-20:5 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn 
Aft, 1119 [R. 161 l];Myler Depo., 89:21-90:19, 172:21-173:1 [R. 5059(A)]. As aresult, 
Ellsworth Paulsen formed a short-lived joint venture with Bud Bailey Construction 
Company ("Bud Bailey"). See Myler Depo., 90:20-91:24 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Aff., 
Iffl 20, 22 [R. 1611]; letter to Myler dated April 8, 2005, Deposition Exhibit 19 [R. 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5059(A)]. Shortly after Big-D replaced Bud Bailey as Ellsworth Paulsen's joint venture 
partner, Ellsworth Paulsen withdrew from the joint venture leaving Big-D to build 
Midtown Village alone. See Washburn Aff., ffll 23-24 [R. 1611]; Myler Depo., 92:3-10 
[R. 5059(A)]. Ellsworth Paulsen was thus hardly the common factor the Lien Claimants 
contend it was. 
5. None of the four deposition exhibits cited by the Lien Claimants in support 
of their contention that the plans for Midtown Village did not change are part of the 
record. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 13. Moreover, page 227 of the transcript of Brett 
Harris' deposition is also absent from the record. Even if the Lien Claimants had 
supported their assertions with citations to record evidence, their contention that Midtown 
Village never changed is wrong. A few examples illustrate this fact. First, UWB devoted 
several pages of its principal brief herein to listing a host of changes made to Midtown 
Village. See Brief of Appellant United Western Bank, pp. 15-19. The Lien Claimants 
concede that numerous changes occurred. See Brief of Appellees, at pp. 76-78. Second, 
Allen Washburn, the Midtown Village project manager for both Ellsworth Paulsen and 
Big-D, admitted during his deposition that his affidavit testimony to the effect that the 
plans for Midtown Village did not substantially change since 2002 was false. See 
Deposition of Allen Washburn ("Washburn Depo."), 31:7-34:7 [R. 5059(A)]. Third, 
while the Lien Claimants contend that "[t]he Project has always been a mixed use project 
with a Main Building situated in a 'U' shape consisting of South, North and West wings," 
their own "Fourth Addendum to the Brief," which is a "First Level Floor Plan" of 
Midtown Village, clearly shows that construction of a fourth wing, south of the "South 
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wing" (the "South Tower"), was contemplated. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 13; Brief of 
Appellees, Fourth Addendum to the Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
The Lien Claimants offer three arguments in support of the District Court's 
resolution of the question of lien priority in their favor. First, the Lien Claimants say that 
moving dirt has always amounted to the commencement of construction for purposes of 
Utah's mechanic's lien statute, and the Court ought not disturb the legal landscape. 
Second, the Lien Claimants argue that the existence of "a massive pit" was visible to 
anyone who visited Midtown Village in June 2005, and that UWB had actual knowledge 
of the pit before June 17, 2005. Third, the Lien Claimants contend that whether a 
construction project has been abandoned must be determined by reference to all of what 
they consider to be the relevant facts, not just visible site conditions. According to the 
Lien Claimants, Midtown Village was not abandoned because Myler, the architect and 
UWB's predecessors {i.e., Marshall and BankFirst) all worked ceaselessly to make 
Midtown Village a reality. The Lien Claimants advance this argument even though none 
of the off-site efforts of Myler, the architect or UWB's predecessors was evidenced in 
any way on the site itself. 
The Lien Claimants' first two arguments are legally incorrect and their final 
argument turns on factual determinations that could not be made on a motion for 
summary judgment. First, no Utah court has ever held that simply moving dirt -
excavating - constitutes the commencement of construction of a building. At most, 
Utah's federal court suggested that while some excavation does not amount to the 
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commencement of construction of a structure or improvement, an undefined additional 
quantum of earth movement may. Utah law is thus indefinite and should be clarified by 
alignment with the governing statute. The statute says that in order to constitute 
commencement, the work must be "on the ground for the structure or improvement." 
While constructing footings or a foundation satisfies this standard, merely moving earth 
does not. The District Court thus misinterpreted the mechanic's lien statute by ruling that 
the excavation work performed prior to June 17, 2005 gave the Lien Claimants' alleged 
mechanic's liens priority over UWB's Deed of Trust. 
Second, the Lien Claimants' assertion that Reynolds Brothers' excavation work on 
Midtown Village was visible to any reasonable observer of the site on June 17, 2005 is 
accurate. The Lien Claimants go on to argue at great length that UWB knew about the 
excavation work in advance of June 17, 2005 and should, therefore, concede that its Deed 
of Trust is inferior to their alleged mechanic's liens. UWB's actual knowledge of 
Reynolds Brothers' excavation work is immaterial. Even if excavation work could 
constitute the commencement of construction, commencement turns exclusively on 
constructive notice. The constructive notice standard ensures that the law remains 
consistent. Whether Reynolds Brothers' work gave constructive notice that construction 
of a structure or improvement was underway on June 17, 2005, after the site had been 
devoid of activity for almost six months, is a question of disputed fact that the District 
Court could not resolve on the Lien Claimants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Finally, the Lien Claimants' relation back analysis is confused, inconsistent and 
wrong. They concede that abandonment is a complex fact issue. They also cite this 
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Court's decision in Nu-Trend Electric, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 
Inc., 786 P.2d 1369 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), for the proposition that whether construction 
has been abandoned depends on whether "a reasonable observer of the site would be on 
notice that the persons who performed work apparently did not intend to continue to 
completion." See Brief of Appellees, at p. 55. After paying lip service to these legal 
principles, however, the Lien Claimants inexplicably ignore them. Instead of explaining 
how a vacated, dormant pit in the heart of downtown Orem might notify a reasonable 
passer-by that someone intended to build something, the Lien Claimants argue that 
Myler, his architect and UWB never meant to abandon Midtown Village. Even if their 
off-site activities, imperceptible to "a reasonable observer of the site," were germane to 
the question of abandonment, however, the site's quiet, deserted appearance on June 17, 
2005 meant that whether Midtown Village had been abandoned was a question of 
disputed fact the District Court could not resolve short of a trial. Given that mechanic's 
liens cannot relate back to earlier work if the earlier work was abandoned, the District 
Court's error on the question of abandonment requires reversal even if the District 
Court's commencement determination was correct. 
I. MOVING EARTH IS NOT COMMENCEMENT OF 
CONSTRUCTION UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-5 
Instead of explaining why the clearer, statute-based commencement standard 
UWB advocates is a bad idea, the Lien Claimants argue for rigid submission to what they 
claim is stare decisis. The Lien Claimants' argument has at least two significant flaws. 
First, the Lien Claimants' contention that '"actual excavation for the foundation' of a 
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building is commencement" is not the holding of any Utah case. See Brief of Appellees, 
at p. 19 (apparently quoting E. W. Allen & Assocs., Inc. v. FDIC, 776 F. Supp. 1504 (D. 
Utah 1991)). UWB is thus not asking the Court to overturn any precedent by arguing that 
earth-moving is not the commencement of construction for purposes of Utah's 
mechanic's lien statute. Second, given that there is presently no clear line of demarcation 
between what does and does not constitute the commencement of construction of a 
structure or improvement in Utah's commencement cases, establishing a bright-line 
standard would hardly violate the principle of due respect for precedent on which the 
Lien Claimants found their argument. 
The Lien Claimants' contention that mechanic's liens relate back to "the time of 
the commencement to do work" is based on a selective reading of Section 38-1-5 of the 
Utah Code. The statute does not say that any work on the subject property establishes the 
time to which mechanic's liens relate back. Moreover, the statute has never been 
interpreted to mean that any on-site work, regardless of the nature or extent of the work, 
constitutes "commencement" for purposes of Section 38-1-5. Rather, the statute says that 
the work must be "on the ground for the structure or improvement." Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-5. Thus, whether making irrigation system improvements, installing fencing, 
surveying, staking and soil testing - all of which unquestionably involved work -
amounted to commencement for purposes of Section 38-1-5 was a fact question not 
subject to resolution on a motion for summary judgment. See EDSA/Cloward, L.L.C. v. 
Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, ffl| 20-30, 122 P.3d 646. 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Although the Lien Claimants contend that "[a]n examination of the cases decided 
in Utah reveals that 'actual excavation for the foundation' of a building is 
commencement of work/5 they neglect to actually examine any commencement cases. 
See Brief of Appellees, at p. 19. Instead, the Lien Claimants merely string-cite a half-
dozen Utah cases, and a Kansas case. See id., n.37. The only case cited by the Lien 
Claimants to suggest that excavation for a foundation constitutes the commencement of 
construction for purposes of Section 38-1-5 was decided by the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah. The federal court did not cite a Utah case holding that 
excavation equals commencement, but relied instead on the same Kansas decision cited 
by the Lien Claimants for that proposition. See E. W. Allen & Assocs., Inc. v. FDIC, 776 
F. Supp. 1504, 1509-10 (D. Utah 1991) (citing Davis-Wellcome Mortgage, 336 P.2d at 
466). The federal court also observed, however, that "general excavation on the land" is 
not sufficient to be commencement. Id. (citing United Lumber Co. v. Minmar Inv. Co., 
All S.W.2d 630, 633 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) and Clark v. General Elec. Co., 420 S.W.2d 
830, 834 (1967)). The court did not identify or explain the difference between "general 
excavation" and "actual excavation for the foundation of a building." Nor did the court 
suggest how someone observing an excavated piece of property might distinguish 
2
 Specifically, the Lien Claimants cite E. W. Allen & Assoc., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 776 F.Supp. 1504 (D. Utah 1991); EDSA/Cloward, L.L.C v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT 
App 367, 122 P.3d 646; Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982); 
Western Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr., 424 P.2d 437 (Utah 1967); First 
of Denver Mortgage Investors v. C N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979); 
Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Development Co., 784 
P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); and Davis-Wellcome Mortgage Corp. v. Long-Bell 
Lumber Co., 336 P.2d 463 (Kan. 1959). 
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between "general excavation" and "actual excavation for the foundation of a building" to 
determine whether the former had evolved into the latter such that mechanic's lien rights 
may have arisen. Indeed, there was no evidence before the court that a foundation had 
been dug. The E. W. Allen court's references to excavation are thus dicta and E. W. Allen 
is, therefore, neither a helpful nor authoritative statement of Utah law. 
The Lien Claimants also cite EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 
367, 122 P.3d 646, in support of their excavation-equals-commencement theory, although 
they neglect to say why. Klibanoff "involved some ditch-digging, but not excavation. In 
any event, this Court remanded the case because "reasonable persons could differ" about 
whether the ditch-digging, orange fencing and survey work at issue collectively 
"provided notice that lienable work was underway." Id., at f^ 28. Next, the Lien 
Claimants cite Colder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), and Western 
Mortgage Loan Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 424 P.2d 437 (Utah 1967), for 
the proposition that excavation marks the commencement of a structure or improvement. 
Neither opinion actually says as much, however. The mechanic's lien claimants in 
Calder Bros, attempted to tack their liens back to "maintenance work" that consisted of 
weed-cutting, felling trees, grouting cracks and painting. See Calder Bros., 652 P.2d at 
923. The lien claimants in Western Mortgage also sought to tack their liens back, but to 
off-site work involving water mains and sewer lines. See Western Mortgage, 424 P.2d at 
439. Both cases state that the on-site presence of materials or evidence that work has 
been performed establishes commencement, although those pronouncements are not the 
holding of either case. In any event, materials are not at issue in this case, and more 
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recent decisions such as ^//^a^o^Tdemonstrate that the occurrence of some work on-site, 
even preparatory work, does not necessarily amount to the commencement of a structure 
or improvement.3 The Lien Claimants go on to cite First of Denver Mortgage Investors 
v. C N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), and Ketchurn, Konkel, Barrett, 
Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), for the proposition that excavating for a footing is "the commencement to do work 
. . . on the ground for the structure or improvement." Like the cases cited before them, 
neither of these opinions holds that excavation is commencement for purposes of the 
mechanic's lien statute. The former involved the installation of sewer and water systems, 
and the latter surveying, staking and soil-testing. Excavation was not at issue in either 
case.4 The Lien Claimants thus have not cited any controlling authority in support of 
their claim that excavation is commencement for purposes of Section 38-1-5. 
Several of the seven non-Utah cases cited by the Lien Claimants for the 
proposition that excavation "qualifies as 'commencement to do work'" involved the 
interpretation of mechanic's lien statutes quite different from Utah's. See Brief of 
Appellees, at p. 37 & n.76. For example, the statute at issue in Wooldridge Construction 
Although the Lien Claimants chide UWB for characterizing excavation as "site 
preparation," the Lien Claimants go much further by presuming to expressly define site 
preparation so as not to include excavation. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 34 n.67. The 
Lien Claimants offer no authority for their definition. 
4
 The Lien Claimants seem particularly sure that First of Denver Mortgage Investors 
"held that site excavation work did constitute the start of work." Brief of Appellees, at p. 
38 n.78. Their confidence is misplaced. Neither the word "excavate" nor any word 
derived from it appears anywhere in the opinion. The work at issue in that case 
"consisted of locating existing [utility] lines and putting in pipeline, water and sewer 
systems, and storm drains." First of Denver Mortgage Investors, 600 P.2d at 523. 
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Co. v. First National Hank of An. <"/w, M 1 P M 1 '» I \\\/ I * 'X1 I cxnrcsslv provided that 
mecl i< u lie's liens attached at "the time the labor was commenced. A/ . at 18 (quoting 
A.R.S. § 33-992). Unlike Utah ' s statute, the Arizona statute did not tic me iai>oi u me 
structure or improvement ; • )regon mechanic 's lit/11 slaluk al issue in A^Arn-// r 
Thatclh f\ i 'i I I* :M S^i (Ore, PKilM contained a provision expressly providing a lien for 
"[a]ny person who shall , . . grade, Idi H. • >r mhenvise improve (he 'm " A/., at 864 
(quoting O.R.S. § 87.010(2)). I Jtah's statue contains no such provision hinallv, 
}\ -./.. , ; Tth >- - ;.,,/-/• - ( /?.»,//-. •'• ; 'S ** ,v •<•• : cmi. 1968), did nol involve 
excavation. The couu held thai the mechanic 's lien at issue attached when a foundation 
was constructed. Sec id i t ° 1 1 Williams Lumber is thus no I lelp to the I ien Claimants, 
b u t a p P ' i e - . ;Mv « IM ' 
I he Lien Claimants accuse U W B of misstating the holdings of Divers ifiec / 
Mortgage Investors v. Gepada, Inc., 401 F.Supp. 682 (S.D. Iowa 1975), and United 
Lumbei < <- • w, ,-, . , ^estments Ct >., V 72 S V'V 2c 1 630 (} L » Cl \ j: i-|: >. IS " ; 1/; S • • Brief 
i * . , - ' " WB cited these cases for the proposition that not just any 
on-site work amounts to commencement for mechanic 's lien purposes. It is the I .ien 
Claimants who misread the cases. According to Hie I ien I 'laiinanis, hnih iasrs "liinMI . . . 
ihal MilMaiitial e.vein alinn wmk in (lie nalure of footings and basements represents the 
start oi work for purposes of lien p r ionu >.J Gepada did not involve any excavation. 
The court 's "Findings of Fact" indicate thai »i\ ineiies wi K psoil was removed fit: oi i i tl ic 
subjeel p ioperh , i ' I.niii.il ^loiiinlhieakin;1 u u u i r n l .null "adtia! svork on Ihe footings 
ie building" began thereafter. See Gepada, 401 F.Supp. at 683-84. The court did 
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not mention excavation, but held that the mechanic's lien accrued on "the date actual on-
site work began on the motel footings." Id., at 687. And, the United Lumber court 
reversed summary judgment in favor of the mechanic's lien claimant because the 
evidence of commencement - affidavit testimony to the effect that "clearing, grading, and 
excavating necessary for the development of the Woodmoor Acres Subdivision" occurred 
on a certain date - was "an ambiguous phrase which may or may not have some 
connection to the commencement of the residences" against which the mechanic's lien 
was asserted. United Lumber, 472 S.W.2d at 632-34. Quite how the Lien Claimants read 
United Lumber to hold that substantial excavation amounts to the commencement of a 
structure is a mystery. 
The Court should take this opportunity to do away with the uncertainty and 
confusion inherent in Utah's current commencement jurisprudence. Tying the 
commencement of construction of a structure or improvement to an unspecified quantity 
of an indistinguishable variety of excavation is unworkable and impossible to justify 
under the governing statute.5 The statute says that mechanic's liens "relate back to, and 
take effect as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the 
5
 Interestingly, while they contend on one hand that Utah's commencement law as it 
relates to excavation is already crystal clear, on the other hand the Lien Claimants lobby 
for a commencement standard not delineated in any Utah case: "[clearing and grubbing 
excavation work, done to provide a level site" ought not be commencement, but 
"[e]xcavation below grade" should. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 34 n.67. The problem 
with this alternative standard, other than the fact that it has no basis in the governing 
statute, is that the line between excavation at or above grade and excavation below grade 
is razor thin, subject to change, and thus impossible to reliably identify. The better 
approach - the one firmly grounded in Section 38-1-5 - is to link commencement with 
the construction or installation of something for which a building permit is required, i.e., 
something permanent, visible and obviously man-made, such as footings or a foundation. 
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ground h»r (In: si nn 11 lit: in improwMncnl IHnlM'tidi. Ann K W-l-^ Vv bile the Lien 
Clain mi its woi ild prefer that the Court simply ignore the phrase "for the structure or 
improvement," the statute must be construed as a whole, with meaning given to -M A the 
language chosen by the legislating, ^cc Anacrsor • , <  • * .... ^ 
•••o -\ . • * . i lost faithful to the language of the statute is to 
disentangle commencement In--- guantilaih c discussions about earth movement and 
hold instead that commencement is the physical addition tc • it le lai 01 i le i na t e i ials 01 
A v a i llnil k e n i n e pit"' i il"' (he i;|i'iiii"hif'r <»i* iiiipivii ii'iiii'iii ' ii, in i | ! i .
 4 words, are ior the 
structure or improvement."* 
In this case, the only work performed on the subject property prior to the date on 
winch I l\A'B s DuJ NI I usI vwi» IVMIUIMI I\.I>. \, u,i i '-' '• 
to keep the excavation from collapsing;. Neither the removal of earth, regardless of the 
quantity, nor the shoring work were "for the structure or improvement," which was 
commenced months K^ \ Rather, tl le eai tl IW 01: k ai id shoi ii ig i i lei el) prepared tl le site for 
lain" < i IKISII IIUIH m As a result
 t neither amounted to "the commencement to do work or 
1 he Lien Claimants' accusing UWB of disingenuit) for "attempting] to equate 
'clearing and grubbing' with the excavation of a gunite and soil nailed jumbo basement" 
is unfortunate and uncalled for. Brief of Appellees, at pp. 38-39. IJWB has never argued 
that clearing and grubbing are the same as excavating a "jumbo basement." The lines 
between clearing, grubbing, grading, "general excavation" and "actual excavation for the 
foundation of a building" are, however, purely quantitative and thus inherently unclear. 
For example, versions of Big-D's own payment application- h i "siiework""* ami 
"[ejarthwork & [s]ite [improvements" without distinguishing between different i) pes uf 
excavation. See Application and Certification for Payment, Deposition Exhibit 35 [R. 
5059(A)]; Application and Certification for Payment, Deposition Exhibit 36 [R 
5059(A)]. UWB makes no apology for advocating the adoption of a hriehi-lim i 
commencement based on the construction of a footing or foundation. 
• » > 
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furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement.55 The Lien Claimants' 
alleged mechanic's liens cannot, therefore, relate back to the excavation or shoring work. 
As the District Court ruled to the contrary, its decision should be reversed. 
II. UWB'S ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF EXCAVATION WORK IS 
IMMATERIAL 
The Lien Claimants devote considerable energy to arguing that UWB had actual 
knowledge, prior to June 17, 2005, of the existence of Reynolds Brothers' excavation 
work. Whatever the merit of the Lien Claimants' factual assertion, UWB's actual 
knowledge that excavation work had been performed is immaterial. For purposes of 
commencement, only constructive notice of ongoing, on-site construction work matters. 
The federal court decision on which the Lien Claimants rely most heavily, i.e., E. 
W. Allen & Assocs., Inc. v. FDIC, 776 F.Supp. 1504 (Utah 1991), makes it clear that 
actual knowledge of construction work has no bearing on the question of when 
commencement occurs for mechanic's lien purposes. According to E. W. Allen, 
The phrase "commencement to do work" means that actual visible on site 
improvements must be present. Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1227. The 
improvements must be of such a nature that they represent an actual 
beginning of improvement on the ground and must be visible to the extent 
that a person using reasonable diligence in examining the premises would 
be able to see it and be on notice that lienable work was underway. 
Id., at 1509 (citations omitted). The court went on to cite a number of Utah and other 
cases for the proposition that the "problem is one of notice to [the] world that liens may 
7
 In addition to citing E. W. Allen, the Lien Claimants also purport to quote Calder Bros. 
Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). See Brief of Appellees, at p. 29 & n.53. The 
language the Lien Claimants attribute to Calder Bros, is not found anywhere in the 
decision, however. 
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ha vc ; ati; I.I ::l tec: 1 ' ' / i I < 'c i t i i m We sit 7 1 1 Mortgage L < lan Cor\ 1 \ d ittonwood Const? Co., 
4^ IP i 4 J /, 4 J 9
 K{jidh 196 * = "'[N]otice to [the] world" and "person using reasonable 
diligence" describe constructive notice, not actual knowledge. Thus, "actual notice, 
pursuant to I lit" holding in Ketchum, does not establisl 1 pi ic n it) • 1 u idei tl: le stati itev ; 1 athei 
"|t|hr k't'tchuni court 1 onhrmnl Mini, regardless of actual notice, \ isible work or materials 
must be present to establish priority." EDSA/Cloward, LLC v. Klibanoff, 2005 VT App 
367, m 14-15, 122 P 3d 646 
1 his C01 irt chose a consti 1 ictiv e 1 lotice test 1 all: lei thai 1 tl le acti lal knowledge test 
advocated by the Lien Claimants, in order to promote the "predictability sought by the 
mechanic's lien statutory7 schcmr " Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, .\icki-t <i .lust: " 
Heritage Mountain lh'\* ;->/ ••- 'v 1 
constructive notice test serves this goal, without regard to whether the work at issue is 
that of an architect or excavator, by ensuring that the test is the same for all interested 
parties. While the \ isible eontliiiun ol ilir sub)* 111 p i u p n n .11 A\\\ tin 111 111111' is mlnitioil 
i v • -h -v\ cs the site, different interested parties m a j have different degrees of 
actual knowledge of work on the property. Consequently, if commencement turned on 
actual knowledge, mechanic ' s liens n>r the same work 01 1 tl le sai ne pi opei t>< coi ltd ha \ e 
d'*r«M! ;•- - : ,j .,1: iilfcn,ni interestholders . An actual knowledge 
standard would thus be unworkable ami. *.u t surprisingly, the Lien Claimants have cited 
no decision holding tlmt actual knowledge *>; ongoing construction work proves that 
coi 111 ne ncei nent has occi n red for 1 necftai 11c s lien pi 11 poses. 
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Regardless of the distinction between actual knowledge and constructive notice of 
on-site work, the important issue for commencement purposes is not how much was or 
should have been known, but what a visual inspection of the subject property would 
disclose. Again, "[t]he improvements must be . . . visible to the extent that a person using 
reasonable diligence in examining the premises would be able to see it and be on notice 
that Henable work was underway" E. W. Allen, 776 F.Supp. at 1509 (emphasis added). 
Whether a person using reasonable diligence to examine Midtown Village on June 17, 
2005 would have been on notice that Henable work was underway was a disputed issue of 
material fact. The Lien Claimants contend that anyone at the Midtown Village site could 
not fail to see a "massive excavated pit" and must have concluded on that basis alone that 
construction of a structure or improvement was underway. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 
44 ("Given the size of the excavation . . . it was obviously visible to anyone who visited 
the site that construction was underway."). On the other hand, Jim Krumm, a 
representative of BankFirst, testified that when he saw Midtown Village as it looked on 
June 17, 2005 "the site appeared to . . . have been vacated." See Declaration of Jim 
Krumm, f^ 12 [R. 4864]. If the site looked vacated, it could not have simultaneously 
appeared that "Henable work was underway." Indeed, absent workers, materials or 
equipment no work could have been underway, nothing suggested that work on a 
"structure or improvement" had commenced, and there was no on-site indication that any 
further work would ever be undertaken. At the very least, the condition of the site was 
8
 The Lien Claimants' contention is a non sequitur. The conclusion that "construction 
was underway" on June 17, 2005 does not follow logically from the premise that a pit 
was dug months before. 
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ambiguous and that ambiguit) i it idol ibtedl> proi npteda jom nalistto ask "wh> is the giant 
hole on Stale Ntreel in * >ivm where a developer says he's going to build a Gateway 
esque shopping and living center, still just that a giant hole?" See Declaration of Susan 
Moore ("Moore Decl."), 1 7 | K m i • I II , 1.85 ; ']. •• \-.<- . . • ,-.  . . . 
In MIIII. w liefhei I \\\'\\ knew lliat exca^ ;ratio:i I had occurred prior to June i 7, 2005, 
or only had constructive notice of the same fact is immaterial. The parties do not 
disagree about either the occurrence of excavation prior to June 1: 7, 2005 or thai lime silt 
ofMidtown Village was el on • • M- ••• - i noi iths after that date. 
What \ as genuinel \ disputed was what a reasonable person looking at the site on June 
17, 2005 would conclude. Mr. Krumm thought it looked "vacated," while counsel loi the 
I A en Claimants argued that an obseru >• ,. • » MI v. 
Whett ier a reasonable observ er of the site would have thought that w ork on a "structure 
or improvement" had commenced was thus a disputed question of fact. I Jnder these 
circumstances it was improper lor the I hsinei i 'omi in mnM llie lac lnal ileleiiiiiiiii.iliiiuiii 
i - - r r- M % s
 ;R.. ,6^oJ. That factual 
determination can only he ma^L b) ihe ii o indei .ii e \ccordingly, the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment must be reversed. 
T H E U E N CLAIMAN l ^ WORJV ui> ivIIDTOWN VILLAGE DOES 
NOT RELATE BACK TO REYNOLDS BROTHERS7 PRE JUNE 1 , 
2005 EXCAVATION 
The I ien Claimants confuse the test for whether their post-June I ' \ iU • 
construction work telales back In KevunM:: Mrnlhers pre- hine i ' 'mis excavation wmk 
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for purposes of mechanic's lien priority, with the abandonment element of that test. In 
Calder Bros., the court held that 
For one contractor's lien to relate back to the commencement of work . . . 
by another contractor . . . both contractors' projects must have been 
performed in connection with what is essentially a single project performed 
under a common plan prosecuted with reasonable promptness and without 
material abandonment. 
Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). The Lien Claimants 
incorrectly treat the first three elements of this test as if they were factors to be 
considered in the analysis of the fourth element: abandonment. In fact, each element of 
the Calder Bros, test for relation back is distinct. And, as the elements of the test are 
conjunctive, a factual dispute with respect to any of the elements is sufficient to mandate 
reversal of the District Court's decision. See Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1304, 1307-09 (Utah 1987) (reversing summary judgment in plaintiffs favor 
because disputed issue of material fact existed with respect to an element of plaintiff s 
claim). In this case, the material facts relating to all four elements of the Calder Bros. 
test are in dispute. 
A. Midtown Village was Comprised of at Least Three 
Distinct Projects. 
The Lien Claimants' response to UWB's explanation of how construction of the 
Icon Building, excavation, and construction of the South Tower were three separate and 
distinct projects sidesteps the issue altogether. For example, the Lien Claimants make no 
effort to explain why they argued that construction of the Icon Building marked the time 
of commencement when they moved for partial summary judgment, but swiftly 
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a : - ! P u • .. • . « i s • ' * V B noted in: i oppositioi 11 : tl le i i lotioi 1 tl: lat c onsti n lctioi 1 
oi die icon Building was a wholi separate undertaking from both the subsequent 
excavation and even later construction of the South Tower. The I ien Claimants' failure 
to address I I WB's argument ;-, u MJM;:. i ncv simp;. K,;\ e \u> an .Wv-i • : J. = .- . ,i. 
of the tl: iree projects coi: isti: i lctioi :i. of tl: le Icoi i, Bi lilding, excavation and construction of 
the South Tower had separate purposes, different participants, discrete funding sources, 
proceeded under different contracts and were separated from each othei icngchy 
periods of i:::t lacti vity. • ••• •• 
The closest the Lien Claimants get to addressing the significant differences 
between each of the projects comprising Midtown Village is to cite three cases and 
misstate their holdii igs First, tl: le I iei 1 Claii :i :ia:t its cite 1 < 'irst of Dem >e 7 Mot tgage h 1 1 esfot s 
v. C. TV Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979), for the notion that a project is not 
necessarily abandoned if it: has successive owners and if different: "original contractors" 
work thereon. ,v< \Uat 01 Appellees, at " • • . ^ h n , "..v., o- .Jcnwraio •••^oive 
ai 1 ow nersl lip chai lge froi 1 1 01 le c:: 1 itit> to ai lotl iei , botl 1 ow 1 iei ei itities had identical 
ownersh ip such that the change w as one of form., not of substance . See First of Denver, 
600 P.2d at 523 . That si tuation is quite unl ike the one at issue in im>> case; whereas 
]\ l idto\ i - 1 :t \ ? illage w as origii Mill)/ ovv ned b> ]\ lyler 's eoi 1 lpai iry W ; estern Oasis I 'roperties, 
LC, Myler ' s ownership share was reduced to only 25 percent when he formed Midtown 
JV with Moyes in order to obtain construction financing. See Snyder Deck, fflf 5, 10-12 
[\< t(H)^ /U|, Mylu l)i:pi»., J" \ llu M J I , h > » 1 1 ' Id I 'i i In h I Ml l| \i i l h % \ i | . 
Fir^t of /V /nv r sa1- •. nothing about different "original contractors." Next, the Lien 
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Claimants cite Calder Bros, and claim that it "holds that as long as there is continuity in 
the project, the claims of multiple prime contractors will relate back." Brief of 
Appellees, at pp. 69-70. Colder Bros, actually held that three contractors could not tack 
their mechanic's liens back to earlier "ordinary and necessary maintenance" work. See 
Calder Bros., 652 P.2d at 924. Finally, the Lien Claimants cite Duckett v. Olsen, 699 
P.2d 734 (Utah 1985), and assert that Duckett "held that the presence of multiple prime 
contractors does not affect priority as long as it is intended for a single project." Brief of 
Appellees, at p. 70. Not only is the Lien Claimants' reasoning wholly circular, but 
Duckett did not involve "multiple prime contractors." Rather, the property owners 
themselves (the Olsens) acted as general contractor for purposes of constructing a 
residence on their lot. See Duckett, 699 P.2d at 735-36. In relevant part, the Duckett 
court actually held that construction of a single residence was a single project. That 
holding has no application to the far larger and significantly more complex Midtown 
Village. 
The Lien Claimants likewise have no answer for the fact that each of the projects 
comprising Midtown Village had to be and must have been separate because, until June 
17, 2005, there was no funding to build Midtown Village. While Myler may well have 
dreamed of building Midtown Village since before he broke ground for the Icon 
Building, absent the capital to actually do so, his dream amounted to neither a project nor 
apian. 
Instead of tackling UWB's evidence that Midtown Village was really three 
projects, the Lien Claimants argue that Midtown Village was a single project because (1) 
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the marketing n late i ials I J W B 1 is : i t o solicit pai ticipatioi 1 in ,. its c i »t isti i K -tioi i loai i to 
Midt< m i i J \ > 1 >y < >1 lit ;r hi inks c< msistent ly descr ibed M i d t o w n Vill-mc in the s a m e te rms, 
see Brief of Appellees, a! nv ' ' 2 -73; (2) the same plans were incorporated into all three 
general contracts for M i d i o u n Village, see /</.. ai pp n . • i r> g a \ c ,iu same 
Midtown Village. See id., at p . 75. The Lien Claimants ' contentions are wholl) u:iuuin. 
by their failure to cite relevant evidence in support thereof. 
1 1 ie oi il> footi lote associated ( \ it! 11,1 le I iei I Claii nai its' ai gi in lei it tl mt h, lidtc j • i l 
Village was a single project because U W B ' s marketing materials always described 
Midtown Village the same wax * .miains a discussion having nothing 1c -lr with U W B ' s 
marketing mate na- ••<. I K I U Appellees, ai \ v.iiiici. ::u : JCII < Mhi.ants 
devoir •» -M .* .: '/! I- - " m i s - . ' • : i l . ' . , i.::.^. -M a 
fourth] tower was eliminated 'between September 2004 and October 2005'" wlu n 
"[UWB] knows full well that a fourth tower was never even considered to be a realistic 
under consideration is belied by the fact that the fourth tower is clearly depicted in both 
the "Key Plan" section of the plans for Midtown Village dated November 12, 2004 and in 
"I 'h st I • svel Floor I lai ir attache d to the I iei :t Claimants' ' o ( • i I bi ie f '. & n ? Sheet SI06 lb, 
Deposition Exhibit 20 [R. 5059(A)]; Brief of Appellees, Fourth Addendum to the Brief 
The fourth tower was thus realistic enough to h included in the architect's plans Ii i airy 
event, the I .ien Claimants cite precisely no evidence in support of their claim that I J W B's 
markcdiiL' imalci liill1. ilt iciibul Mlfillowit Village ronsislrnlls overtime 
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The Lien Claimants next contend that Midtown Village was a single project 
because the same plans were incorporated into each of the three general contracts for the 
development, dated May 5, 2004, April 25, 2005 and August 23, 2005. See Brief of 
Appellees, at pp. 73-74. The trouble with the Lien Claimants' argument is that the 
evidence they cite in support does not, in fact, provide any support. Specifically, the Lien 
Claimants cite page 94 of the transcript of Allen Washburn's deposition, and deposition 
exhibits 19 and 21. See id., at p. 74 nn.164 & 165. First, the testimony found on page 94 
of the transcript of Mr. Washburn's deposition says nothing about any plans. At most, 
Mr. Washburn authenticated a general contract dated April 25, 2005. See Washburn 
Depo., 94:1-25 [R. 5059(A)]. Second, although the Lien Claimants refer to the first 
general contract for Midtown Village, dated May 5, 2004, their failure to cite it is telling. 
Unlike either of the two later general contracts, that contract was a "Design-Build 
Agreement." See Standard Form of Design-Build Agreement and General Conditions 
Between Owner and Design-Builder, Deposition Exhibit 18 [R. 5059(A)]. As such, it 
made the "Design-Builder," Ellsworth Paulsen Residential, LLC, "responsible for 
procuring or furnishing the design." Id., at p. 4. The contract's use of the future tense 
shows that the parties contemplated the creation of plans not then in existence. Non-
existent plans obviously could not be consistent with later plans, as the Lien Claimants 
say they were.9 Third, neither the April 25, 2005 general contract (to which Tower 
Development and Ellsworth-Paulsen/Bud Bailey Construction, Inc. Joint Venture were 
9
 Appendix A to the Design-Build Agreement lists a handful of drawings dated in late 
2002 and early 2003. None of such drawings are attached to the agreement, however, 
and none are part of the record. 
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parlies] nor HK Vu;!»;ii ;l 3 I, 2(HIS ^enrral UHIIIJH'I llbdwtvn Mitllnw : '• ?"-l -;-• 
Construction Corporation/Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Company Joint Venture) 
includes any plans. See Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor, 
Deposition Exhibit 19; Standard Fori i i of Agreei i lent Betw ec n Owi lei ai id Coi iti at :toi 
Depositioi 1 Exhibit 21 [R 5059( \ )] JJ ' Both agreements refer to plans, but they do so 
only in generic terms as, for example I <I )rawings" and "[specifications." See id, It is 
consequent!^ impossible to tell, based oi •! * ^ ulenci the •, > laimants cite, what 
p: . . .»- , .
 1 -. . . , , .^i Hiiiil^ le int |i 11 whal 
plans the contracts referred to, it is equally impossible for either the District Court or this 
Court to determine that in each case the nlan^ were the snrr ~ 
1 he I ien Claimants'' final ai gi* - . • 1 < 
Village was a single project is that "dui IP J ihis enure uiiie of alleged changes oiiv* 
material abandonment, [UWB] was giving the same plans u > inteiesled potential 
participating banks.' :" Bi ief of Appellees, at p. '"i Mull oi (lie evidence the Lien 
( - - i * • • ' • • IINX IN in »f luiiiinl in Ihe 
record; the ethei \h\\\ w hieh - page 54 of the transcript of Jim Krumm's deposition, 
contains a discussion of email correspondence and says nothing about any plans. See id , 
10
 The District Court misunderstood the fact that, wnn^ me rirst general contract iur 
Midtown Village was a "Design-Build Agreement/" neither of the later contracts - and 
not the contract pursuant to which Midtown Village was actually built were. See 
Transcript of Mot i HI Hearing ("I ranscript"), at pp. 64-65 [K. 8538: : he District Court's 
mistaken belief tha Midtown Village was constructed on n design-build basis likely 
resulted in its erroneous conclusion that the constant change to the plans for Midtown 
Village were normal. See id, 
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consideration. 
Having failed to offer any meaningful or supported argument in opposition to 
UWB's evidence-based explanation of how the development of Midtown Village 
consisted of at least three discrete projects, the Lien Claimants must be deemed to 
concede the point. See Mi Vida Enters, v. Steen-Adams, 2005 UT App 400, f^ 15 n.4, 122 
P.3d 144 (courts will not address unsupported arguments). Given that concession, there 
is no genuine basis for the District Court's determination that Midtown Village was a 
single project. The District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Lien 
Claimants must consequently be reversed. 
B. There Never Was a Common Plan for Midtown Village. 
Myler may well have conceived and fostered the hope and dream of building 
Midtown Village years before any footings were poured. His hopes and dreams were far 
from a "common plan," however. For a hope, dream, desire or aspiration to harden into a 
plan, at least two conditions must exist. First, the end result or object of the plan must be 
determined and known. Second, the planner must have the ability to execute the plan and 
accomplish the object thereof. Absent a concrete goal and the means to achieve it there 
may well be a hope or dream, but there is no plan. 
The common plan element of the Colder Bros, relation back test, much like the 
single project element, promotes certainty in real property ownership by ensuring that 
mechanic's lien claimants assert their claims in timely fashion and cannot unreasonably 
reach back in time to assert liens having priority as of the time of much earlier, unrelated 
work. A hypothetical example illustrates the principle and shows why the purported plan 
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plai 11 : bi lild Is lidtc • v* "i 1 ^ Ullage to a particular end result, Myler could have built three 
towers and proceeded to sell all of the units therein. IIlen, five years later, Myler could 
decide to bn id ;he lourth tower depicted in the Tirsi i C\L. \ w-oi rian aiiaeii^ v :,e 
would be able to claim a mechanic's lien having priority as of the commencement yi 
construction of the earliest tower. In that case, the property interests of all those who had 
purchased i n lits ii 1 th< - v:,  er(s) \ v 31 ild si ldde 1 :il;> b e si lbject t : • 1 1 le :::1 lai lie' s lie 1:1s aboi it 
which they knew nothme when they purchased their units. The requirement that a 
mechanic's lien claimant's work be performed pursuant to a specific, predetermined plan 
with a fixed end result exists to prevent uii> w\\ ui injustice. 
Neitl ler tl le end resi ill: of the pi • % .-; Ha ; . \ \IM .thihi\ n e ; uic 
the plan and accomplish the object thereof was established ^sui well alter June 17 200^ 
First, Myler's goal - the object oi ins supposed plan - was never really fixed. MY ler s 
origii ml :onceptioi 1 of I\ lidtoi \ • : -? * n 
JV eventually obtained a permit iu baild. U WB identified at least six major, structural 
changes to the plans for Midtown Village in its principal brief. These changes included, 
for example. Ihe wliokvuik reloialioii ol dill nil (lie healing, UIOIIIIJL' .mini lire suppie'.smn 
systems for Midtown Village from the roof to a newl> conceived underground structure 
known as the "central plan!/' the elimination of an entire t-.- es and (he enclosure • -f 
open-air atrmm>. a; .nSeiun«ii u au, ;.alt-dozen changes te ;ae j ian.\ a,.a ^aeuu u 
fi mdamei ital nati ire of ]\ lidtow 1: 1 y Ullage (i.e. , made it< : developing a: and 
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changed the concept from outdoor entryways to enclosed atriums), UWB also identified a 
host of other lesser, but still significant, revisions. The Lien Claimants do not and cannot 
argue that these changes did not occur. Instead, they pick a handful of the changes and 
purport to divide them into two time periods: before groundbreaking in late 2004, and 
after June 17, 2005. See Brief of Appellees, at pp. 76-78. The Lien Claimants offer no 
explanation for their choice of these periods and make no attempt to identify the 
significance or purpose of their division. The Lien Claimants' focus on the times at 
which the plans changed appears intended to show that the constant evolution of the plans 
did not delay Midtown JV's financing. See id., at p. 78 ("There is no evidence that any 
design change . . . had any delaying impact on the closing of the construction loan."). 
Assuming this to have been the point of the Lien Claimants' exercise, it is altogether 
unclear why they undertook it. UWB did not argue that design changes delayed 
financing. UWB catalogued design changes to show that there was no common plan for 
Midtown Village. Far from having a common and consistent plan, the size, layout, scale, 
appearance and systems of Midtown Village changed continually. 
The absence of a common plan is also reflected by the fact that Orem issued 
building permits for various components of Midtown Village only as and when the plans 
for those components were sufficiently complete. For example, Orem issued a building 
permit for the underground parking structure beneath the South Tower on October 7, 
2005; for the first above-ground work on the South Tower on February 13, 2006; for the 
parking structure beneath the northernmost tower (the "North Tower") on March 7, 2006; 
and finally for the above-ground work on the North Tower not until October 27, 2006. 
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S e e i - . i . i ! ^ • • • • M • !'...!M : De. " ' ""-98]. 
Second, no uktiler how earnestK MK ]er wished lo bund Midtown Village, and no 
matter how furiously he worked io reach his goal, 1le was altogether incapable of turning 
his dream into something tangible ui itil Ji u le 1' / , 2005. ( )i \\y tl ic t I, \ \ I: tei ll le fn lalb • 
obtained the :t i IOI le ] ' tc • pay foi coi isti i ictiol I and became financial h capable of making 
Midtown Village a reality; did his dream congeal inlo an ac iu.il plan. Indeed, the first 
general contract for the construction of Midtow . • I lagc between Tower Development 
andEllsw or th l 'ai Usei I express,!) coi iditioned 1 iJ Isw oi tl i I 'ai Usei I s cii lty to c -oi iii nei ice 
work on Tower Deve lopment ' s obtaining the necessary construction financing. See 
Standard Form of Design-Build Agreement and General Condit ions Between Owner and 
Design-Builder, § I 1 3 Dej M >si1 u >i I Exhil )it 18 |[R 50590 ^ )] J " itl u n .1 .fin; n icil ig, 
therefore, Midtown Village was never more than Myler's fantasy. 
The Lien Claimants' suggestion that the Court need only look to the drawings and 
photographs of a model found in the first addendum to IMCJ. r-nu u> :eaam -. n , 
the Project fron i beginnh ig to tl ic: e nd is si ibstanti; i \<\un> uanarkable for several 
reasons. Brief of Appel lees , at pp . 7>-7(v Hrst. the drawings and photographs are 
undated. They are consequently -^capable ol re \u i l ing anything al .*.• J . a Midtown 
Village inmi! brg inmn^ In tin mil Second tin" plinlngrnplis an* nl a innde! anil llir 
drawings are an art ist 's renderings. None purport to depict anything that was actually 
constructed (or for which a construction contract or construction plans ever existed) and 
tin: 1 Kim < laiiiiJiiils' h,i n; nlenli l inl inn e\ iilem/e In snppoil ,I «" I I i in lh.il lin; sliiiitiit : 
shown in their drawings and photographs were ever actually built. In short, the Lien 
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Claimants' pictures are no help at all in answering the question of whether there was a 
common plan for Midtown Village. 
The Lien Claimants' have failed to either refute the fact that the plans for Midtown 
Village changed constantly or show how, despite the constant change, there was 
nonetheless a common plan for Midtown Village. Having failed on both fronts it is 
apparent that the District Court's conclusion that "there was a common plan on the 
Project - the Project remained a mixed use project with essentially the same make up in 
the uses" was premature and incorrect. See Corrected Order, at p. 6 [R. 7852]. Given the 
number and magnitude of the changes to the plans for Midtown Village, reasonable 
minds could readily differ on the question of whether there was a common plan. This 
Court should, therefore, remand this action to the District Court for a trial. 
C. Whether the Construction of Midtown Village was 
Prosecuted with Reasonable Promptness Was a Question 
of Disputed Material Fact. 
The Lien Claimants' own characterization of the evidence before the District 
Court with respect to the reasonable promptness element of the Calder Bros, test is 
illuminating: "[UWB] cites no testimony or credible evidence that the Project did not 
proceed with reasonable promptness under the circumstances of this deal." Brief of 
Appellees, at p. 79 (emphasis added). By referring to "credible evidence" the Lien 
Claimants obviously concede, albeit implicitly, that there was, in fact, evidence before 
the District Court tending to show that Midtown Village was not constructed with 
reasonable promptness. Indeed, there was compelling evidence. Four months of 
inactivity followed construction of the Icon Building, and the site was dormant again for 
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another nine months after mass excavation concluded. See Affidavit of Allen Washburn, 
«[[ 5 (averring that construction of the Icon Building was completed in April or May 2004) 
[R. 1613]; Beardall DecL, ffi[ 5, 9-10 (testifying that the City of Orem authorized 
excavation of the Midtown Village site on September 13, 2004 and issued a building 
permit for the South Tower parking structure on October 7, 2005) [R. 4878, 4889, 4898-
4900]; Deposition of Gary Reynolds, 123:17-124:3 (Reynolds Brothers last excavation 
work occurred on January 5, 2005) [R. 5059(A)]; Myler Depo., 178:23-181:6, 189:24-
192:2 (no on-site work occurred between the completion of excavation and the issuance 
of a building permit for the South Tower) [R. 5059(A)]. Given that evidence of these 
periods of inactivity, no matter how credible, was properly before the District Court on 
the Lien Claimants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the District Court erred in 
one or both of two ways by granting the motion. 
The District Court erred in the first place if, as the Lien Claimants suggest, it 
considered UWB's evidence of long periods of inactivity at Midtown Village to be 
incredible. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 79 ("[UWB] cites no testimony or credible 
evidence that the Project did not proceed with reasonable promptness . . . . " ) (emphasis 
added). Courts may not weigh evidence or resolve questions of credibility on motions for 
summary judgment. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100-01 
(Utah 1995). Consequently, if the Lien Claimants are right about the District Court's 
having found evidence to be incredible, the Lien Claimants' partial summary judgment 
should be reversed. 
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Either alternatively or in addition, the District Court certainly erred by concluding 
that the construction of Midtown Village was prosecuted with reasonable promptness. 
What constitutes reasonableness is a prototypical question of fact. See EDSA/Cloward, 
L.L.C. v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367,1f 21, 122 P.3d 646 (citing Taylor v. Johnson, 393 
P.2d 382, 385 (Utah 1964)) ("Questions of reasonableness are typically questions of 
fact."). The District Court was faced with evidence that there was no on-site activity at 
Midtown Village for months at a time, and that Myler separately proceeded with the Icon 
Building, mass excavation, and eventually construction of the South Tower only as and 
when he became financially capable of doing so. While a fact finder would be entitled to 
conclude on the basis of this evidence that Midtown Village was constructed with 
reasonable promptness despite the nine months of on-site inactivity between mass 
excavation and construction of the South Tower, it was improper for the District Court to 
apply its own opinion of reasonableness. See Corrected Order, at p. 10 ("The same 
project that was commenced with the excavation for the mat footings and the 
underground parking was prosecuted, under the circumstances of this Project, with 
reasonable promptness . . . .") [R. 7848]. It would have been at least equally reasonable 
for the District Court to infer that construction was not proceeding with reasonable 
promptness. Indeed, the District Court could have taken judicial notice of the fact that 
enormous excavated holes in the heart of Utah's downtown areas do not generally sit idle 
and vacant for months at a time. In the extremely rare case when construction does not 
begin immediately following large-scale excavation, as the Lien Claimants observe was 
the case with what they call the "Sugarhouse Hole," the "reasonable promptness" element 
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of the Colder Bros, test will not be satisfied and the project is invariably abandoned (as 
was the Sugarhouse project). See Brief of Appellees, at p. 83 n.191. 
The Lien Claimants make no effort to justify the District Court's decision by 
arguing, for example, that Midtown Village was constructed with reasonable promptness 
as a matter of law. Instead, the Lien Claimants explain - somewhat incongruously - that 
although UWB "proceeded with reasonable promptness to get the financing of the Project 
funded," Midtown Village was complex and the construction delays were caused by the 
concomitantly large amount of time it took Midtown JV to obtain a construction loan. 
See Brief of Appellees, at pp. 78-80. Even assuming the accuracy of the Lien Claimants' 
explanation, they fail to account for the four month period between June 17, 2005, when 
Midtown JV obtained its construction loan, and October 2005, when construction of the 
South Tower actually began. Like the similar hiatus between construction of the Icon 
Building and mass excavation, no construction work occurred during that period. Absent 
any explanation for that period of inactivity, there was no basis upon which the District 
Court could conclude that construction proceeded with reasonable promptness. The 
District Court thus erred in ruling as a matter of law that development of Midtown 
Village was prosecuted with reasonable promptness. 
D. Midtown Village was Materially Abandoned. 
The District Court also erred in its analysis of the final element of the relation 
back test. A mechanic's lien may only relate back to earlier work for purposes of priority 
if the earlier work was not materially abandoned. See Colder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 
P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1982). Whether earlier work was abandoned "is such a fact-
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sensitive question . . . [that it] cannot be decided as a matter of law." EDSA/Cloward, 
L.L.C. v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, U 25 n.4, 122 P.3d 646 (citing Nu-TrendElectric, 
Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)). It was consequently improper for the District Court to grant the Lien Claimants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
1. The Legal Test for Abandonment. 
The Lien Claimants' contention that UWB wants the Court to "change Utah's 
current established [abandonment] standard" is wrong. Brief of Appellees, at pp. 21-25. 
According to the Lien Claimants, "Utah's established legal precedent" with respect to 
abandonment is Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain 
Development Co., 784 P.2d 1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). See id. The Lien Claimants' 
dependence on Ketchum is misplaced for at least two reasons. First, the Ketchum Court 
did not purport to establish a test for abandonment. Rather, the Court noted some general 
principles derived from a handful of cases from other states and concluded that "what 
constitutes [abandonment] . . . is a complex inquiry" requiring an examination of the facts 
and the making of findings. Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1225-26 (citing Macklndust., Inc. v. 
Donald W. Nelson, Inc., 134 So.2d 821 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961); Dickason Goodman Lumber 
Co. v. Foresman, 251 P. 70 (Okla. 1926); Brettschneider v. Wellman, 41N.W.2d 255 
(Minn. 1950); Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 311 A.2d 780 (Md. 1973)). 
Second, Ketchum is not the Court's most recent abandonment decision. A year after 
Ketchum, and in reliance on Ketchum, this Court formulated the test for abandonment as 
follows: "a construction project has been materially abandoned when a reasonable 
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observer of the site would be on notice that the persons who performed the work 
apparently do not intend to continue it to completion." Nu-Trend Electric, Inc. v. Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, Inc., 786 P.2d 1369, 1371 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(emphasis added). Nu-Trend Electric thus established the test for abandonment in Utah 
and UWB has only ever advocated the application of precisely that test.11 
The Nu-Trend Electric test, just like the test for the commencement of 
construction, is concerned with readily apparent site conditions and what those conditions 
would disclose to an observer. Both tests should, and not surprisingly do, share the same 
focus because both relate to mechanic's lien priority. Constructive notice to third-parties 
is the key to both tests. See Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, \ 21 ("Whether the work and 
materials provided adequate notice depends on if a reasonable person would know by 
looking at the land that lienable work is underway."); Nu-Trend Electric, 786 P.2d at 
1371 ("The question is primarily one of notice;. . . ."). 
It is appropriate that the test for abandonment should turn on constructive notice -
and not actual knowledge, as the Lien Claimants argue - because of the circumstances in 
which abandonment matters. The issue of abandonment arises only when work on real 
property was begun, but for some reason stalled, and a then third-party contemplates 
acquiring an interest in the subject property. Being able to see that some work has 
11
 UWB does not ask the Court to disregard Utah law in favor of adopting either the 
Kansas or Oregon rules described in Langford Tool & Drill Co. v. Phenix Biocomposites, 
LLC, 668 N.W.2d 438, 443-44 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). See Brief of Appellees, at p. 22. 
UWB cited Langford Tool in its principal brief to show that even in states where the 
developer's intent is a key factor in an abandonment analysis, that intent must be 
discerned from an observation of the subject property. 
40 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
occurred on the property, the third-party - ordinarily a lender or buyer - will only 
exchange money for an interest in the property if they are confident that the earlier work 
has been abandoned. Indeed, only if the prior work were abandoned would the third-
party have the comfort of knowing that those who later work on the property cannot 
claim mechanic's liens having priority over the interest the third-party proposes to 
acquire. Constructive notice thus appropriately balances the rights of those who provide 
construction labor and materials with those of construction lenders and property buyers. 
See Superior Constr. Servs. v. Belton, 749 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) 
(constructive notice based on "the actual and visible beginning of the improvement on the 
ground" balances the policy of protecting mortgagees with that of safeguarding the rights 
of laborers and materialmen). 
If the legal test for abandonment of a construction project were based on the 
subjective intent of the developer, as the Lien Claimants argue, stalled projects would 
never be sold or financed, and in most cases would likely end up aborted. This is because 
property developers are well-known for their boundless, irrepressible optimism; like 
Myler, they always intend to complete their projects regardless of the obstacles they 
encounter along the way. The developer's subjective intent thus cannot be the touchstone 
for abandonment. If it were, the "without material abandonment" element of the Calder 
Bros, test would always be satisfied and would, therefore, cease to have any significance. 
Rather, abandonment must be assessed on the basis of circumstances likely to more 
reliably reflect the true condition of the construction project. The Nu-Trend Electric test, 
with its focus on what a "reasonable observer of the site" would have notice of and could 
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reasonably infer, turns on just such circumstances. 
2. The District Court Erred in Ruling that 
Midtown Village was Not Abandoned. 
Although the Lien Claimants acknowledge the Nu-Trend Electric test, and even go 
so far as to quote the precise language of the test, they inexplicably ignore it and never 
address the question of what a reasonable observer of the Midtown Village site would 
have seen on June 17, 2005. Likewise, the District Court's Corrected Order, which the 
Lien Claimants drafted, wholly ignores the condition of the site on June 17, 2005. 
Instead of focusing on the relevant Nu-Trend Electric "reasonable observer" test for 
abandonment, the Lien Claimants argue that no witness testified that Midtown Village 
was abandoned and neither UWB, Myler nor the Lien Claimants abandoned their efforts 
to make Midtown Village a reality. See Brief of Appellees, at pp. 57-60. So, they 
conclude, Midtown Village was not abandoned. Even assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that nobody ever said they were abandoning Midtown Village and that off-site 
planning and financing work proceeded uninterrupted, the District Court nonetheless 
erred by improperly weighing disputed facts and ruling that Midtown Village was not 
materially abandoned. 
First, the off-site activities relied upon by the Lien Claimants and the District 
Court are irrelevant. Off-site activities are germane to the question of abandonment only 
to the extent that they are evidenced by some on-site condition visible to a third-party 
observer of the site. See Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1226 (quoting Frank J. Klein & Sons, Inc. 
v. Laudeman, 311 A.2d 780 (Md. 1973)) ("'[I]f there is an objective manifestation of 
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intent that the work on that project should come to a halt, only the construction performed 
before work ceases pursuant to that intention has a lien priority."5) (emphasis added). A 
"reasonable observer of the site" could not and would not have seen or otherwise been 
aware of any of the following activities the Lien Claimants contend show that Midtown 
Village was not abandoned: 
• UWB "continued to try and finance it," see Brief of Appellees, at p. 6012; 
• Myler sought a guarantor with sufficient resources to convince UWB to 
fund construction, see id., at p. 60; 
• Myler sought a general contractor with sufficient bonding capacity to build 
Midtown Village, see id., at pp. 60-61; 
• Myler worked "persistently and consistently" to secure financing, obtain 
bonds, court prospective condominium buyers and employ architects and 
contractors, see id., at p. 64, 81-82 ; 
• Realtors sent newsletters to prospective condominium buyers, see id., at pp. 
65, 82; 
12
 In their footnote 132, the Lien Claimants refer the Court to various email messages 
purportedly attached to the reply memorandum in support of their Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. In fact, no email messages were ever attached to the Lien 
Claimants9 reply memorandum and the referenced messages are not part of the record. 
13
 The Lien Claimants' contention that various subcontractors "met frequently at the site" 
is not supported by the record. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 82 & n.190. The only 
witness whose testimony the Lien Claimants cite testified that he attended design 
meetings; he did not identify the venue for those meetings. See Deposition of Eddie 
Ballard, 15:12-18 [R. 5059(A)]. 
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• Beginning in 2002, Myler entered into a number of Development 
Agreements with the City of Orem, see id., at pp. 66-67 ; and 
• The City of Orem "worked on and ultimately concluded the issuance of 
bond financing," see id., at p. 81. 
Second, instead of the backroom planning and marketing activities the Lien 
Claimants identify, or Myler's goals and visions, a reasonable observer of the Midtown 
Village site on June 17, 2005 would have seen the completed, one year-old Icon 
Building, a large, excavated pit and a chain-link fence surrounding some or all of the pit. 
See Krumm Decl., ffl[ 8-12 [R. 4864-65]; Myler Depo., 178:23-181:6 [R. 5059(A)]. 
There was no activity on the site. See Myler Depo., 178:23-181:6 [R. 5059(A)]. No 
materials were stored on the site, and no equipment was either in use or stored on the site. 
See id. There were no construction trailers or personnel -just the Icon Building, a pit 
and a fence. See Krumm Decl., ffif 8-12 [R. 4864-65]. One observer testified that "the 
site appeared to me to have been vacated." See id., ^  12 [R. 4864]. Another observer 
noted that, ten days after the Deed of Trust was recorded, the "giant hole" was "still just 
that - a giant hole." See Moore Decl., If 7 [R. 4843-44, 4857]. The condition of the site 
thus strongly suggested that it had been abandoned. Indeed, no reasonable observer of 
the site would have expected a gigantic pit in the heart of downtown Orem, one that 
obviously cost a great deal to excavate, to be dormant unless it had been abandoned. 
14
 Only two such agreements are found in the record. See Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Exhibits "B" and "C" [R. 
5352-5417]. Both agreements are dated after June 17, 2005 and the Lien Claimants made 
no effort to authenticate either of them. 
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Common experience teaches that nobody digs a massive pit unless they intend to build 
something in it right away. Thus, even if furious off-site activity by Myler, UWB and the 
Lien Claimants were relevant, the facts supported more than one conclusion with respect 
to abandonment.15 As a result, only a fact finder could say whether abandonment 
occurred. It was consequently error for the District Court to resolve the issue on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
Although they assiduously avoid addressing the "reasonable observer" test set 
forth in Nu-Trend Electric, the Lien Claimants seem to argue that even if the Midtown 
Village site looked vacant and was dormant, it was not abandoned because a "temporary 
cessation of work through a loss of funding does not necessarily mean a project is 
materially abandoned.5' Brief of Appellees, at p. 23 n.43 (emphasis added) (citing 
Brettschneider v. Wellman, 41 N.W.2d 255 (Minn. 1950)); id. at pp. 55-56 (citing 
Ketchum, 784 P.2d at 1226).16 Assuming this to be the Lien Claimants' argument, it does 
Although UWB was entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn in its favor, the 
District Court nonetheless inferred that the vacated Midtown Village site was indicative 
of an active construction project. See Neffv. Neff, 2011 UT 6, l|j 47, P.3d 
(undisputed facts and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in light most favorable to 
nonmoving party on motion for summary judgment). 
16
 The Lien Claimants cite the Brettschneider case for the proposition that "if there is no 
abandonment or severance of the contract" a temporary halt will not mean that 
construction has been abandoned. See Brief of Appellants, at p. 23 n.43. This 
proposition does not help the Lien Claimants because in this case there was not merely a 
"severance of the contract," but three severances: mass excavation was severed from 
Ellsworth Paulsen's design-build contract with Tower Development, Ellsworth Paulsen's 
design-build contract with Tower Development Services was then severed in favor of a 
general contract between the Ellsworth Paulsen/Bud Bailey Construction, Inc. Joint 
Venture and Midtown JV, and, finally, the second general contract was severed in favor 
of a new one between Midtown JV and the Big-D/Ellsworth Paulsen joint venture. See 
Myler Depo., 89:21-91:24 150:15-24, 172:21-173:1 [R. 5059(A)]; letter agreement 
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not withstand scrutiny for various reasons. First, the nine-month period of total inactivity 
on the Midtown Village site following mass excavation was not due to a "loss of 
funding." Myler and the companies with which he was affiliated did not lose their 
funding; until June 17, 2005, they had no funding. This case is quite different from the 
circumstance contemplated by the Ketchum court wherein a developer qualifies for a 
construction loan (because the developer has a plan sufficient to convince a lender to 
lend), begins building and then has to find a new loan when the lender stops paying. In 
this case, construction could not begin until Midtown JV obtained a loan on June 17, 
2005 (and did not actually begin until months later). Second, none of the hallmarks of a 
"temporary cessation" were present on the Midtown Village site on June 17, 2005. 
Indeed, when a temporary hiatus is anticipated a contractor can be expected to leave a 
construction trailer, signs, tools, equipment and materials on the site, ready to be used 
again when work resumes. The presence of those things may be sufficient to alert a 
reasonable observer of the site that, while no work is presently occurring, someone plans 
to work there in the future. No such clues existed at Midtown Village on June 17, 2005. 
Nothing about the appearance of the "vacated" site suggested only a temporary delay.17 
between Myler and Reynolds Brothers, Deposition Exhibit 62 [R. 5059(A)]; Standard 
Form of Design-Build Agreement and General Conditions Between Owner and Design-
Builder, Deposition Exhibit 18 [R. 5059(A)]; Washburn Depo., 19:23-20:5 [R. 5059(A)]; 
Washburn Aff, HU19-24 [R. 1611]; Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and 
Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 19 [R. 5059(A)]; Standard Form of Agreement Between 
Owner and Contractor, Deposition Exhibit 21 [R. 5059(A)]. 
17
 The Lien Claimants refer to the "Sugarhouse Hole project" as an example of a 
construction project that was abandoned. See Brief of Appellees, at p. 83 n. 191. 
Although the Lien Claimants contrast Midtown Village with the Sugarhouse hole -
construction eventually occurred in the former case, but in the latter case the hole was 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Lien Claimants' assertion that a temporary 
cessation of work does not "necessarily" equate to abandonment shows that they concede 
that a temporary cessation of work may mean that construction has been abandoned. 
Given that the Lien Claimants thus concede the existence of a fact dispute where different 
inferences could be drawn, the District Court should not have presumed to either draw 
inferences in favor of the Lien Claimants or resolve the inherently factual question of 
whether abandonment occurred. Summary judgment was thus inappropriate. 
In sum, the material facts were disputed with respect to each of the four elements 
of the Calder Bros. test. Reasonable people can disagree about whether Midtown Village 
was a single project or several. Reasonable minds can differ on the question of whether 
there ever was a common plan for Midtown Village. Only a fact finder could decide 
whether construction of Midtown Village proceeded with reasonable promptness or was 
ever abandoned. The District Court improperly weighed the evidence concerning each 
element in granting the Lien Claimants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District Court's decision and remand the case 
for trial. 
filled-in - in an effort to provide an example of a construction project that was 
* unquestionably abandoned, the Sugarhouse hole example actually demonstrates that 
merely digging a hole is not the commencement of a structure or improvement because it 
does not necessarily reflect a commitment to actually build anything. Further, the mere 
fact that a construction project is eventually completed is not sufficient to show that the 
project was not abandoned, "[otherwise, any uncompleted project could be completed 
months or years later by a different contractor and the statutory time limit. . . would have 
no meaning." In re Estate of Gilbert, 579 N.E.2d 811,813 (Ohio Misc. 1991). 
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IV- THE LIEN CLAIMANTS5 EVIDENCE OF TITLE INSURANCE 
WAS IRRELEVANT AND INADMISSIBLE 
The Lien Claimants devote no time to explaining why or how their evidence that 
UWB had title insurance is relevant to the question of mechanic's lien priority. Instead, 
they fill several pages explaining that on June 17, 2005, UWB knew that Midtown 
Village was a massive pit because the Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. escrow officer 
who closed UWB's loan to Midtown JV had seen the pit. See Brief of Appellees, at pp. 
83-85. Conspicuously missing from the Lien Claimants' argument, however, is any 
authority for the proposition that an escrow officer's knowledge is imputed to the parties 
to the transaction being closed. Like the Lien Claimants, UWB has found no such 
authority. 
Even if a title insurance agent's knowledge of excavation work were attributable 
to UWB, as explained above and previously, UWB's knowledge of the fact that 
excavation had occurred has no bearing whatsoever on when "the commencement to do 
work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or improvement" happened. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5. Indeed, nothing within UWB's knowledge can establish, 
change or even affect the date on which "commencement" took place. The type and 
amount of work sufficient to constitute commencement are legal questions. Moreover, 
the precise moment of commencement passed - whenever it occurred - without any 
regard to UWB's awareness of its passing. There was thus no reason for the Lien 
Claimants to offer evidence that UWB had title insurance to the District Court other than 
to spark a bias in their favor. Regardless of the Lien Claimants' motives, there was no 
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reason for the District Court to admit or consider evidence that UWB had title insurance. 
V, THE LIEN CLAIMANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Only the "successful party" in this mechanic's lien foreclosure action is entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18. It remains to be seen who 
that will be. For example, the Lien Claimants have yet to establish the validity of their 
mechanic's lien claims. Accordingly, the Lien Claimants are not presently entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in UWB's principal 
brief, UWB respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the Lien Claimants. The Court should remand the case to 
the District Court with instructions to: (1) reconsider the question of lien priority under 
the appropriate test set forth herein, i.e., commencement occurs when actual construction, 
as opposed to mere site preparation, is begun; (2) properly apply the four-element Calder 
Bros, test for tacking back to prior work; and (3) exclude evidence of title insurance. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 2011. 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
,, MX^ 
Ronald G. Russell 
Stephen E. W/Hale 
Matthew J. Ball 
Jenifer L. Tomchak 
Attorneys for Appellant United Western 
Bank 
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Stephen E.W.Hale (5285) 
Matthew J. Ball (9414) 
Jenifer L. Tomchak (10127) 
PARR BROWN GEE & LOVELESS, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7750 
Attorneys for United Western Bank, I 
Insurance Corporation, Marshall In\ 
Corporation, Coralee Ellis, James A. 
Edna H. Leavitt, The Leila Welling H 
Family Trust and Phyllis Wilson 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIM RISINGER d/b/a MARATHON TRIADS 
CARPET MILL OUTLET, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
MIDTOWN JOINT VENTURE, LC, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
AND CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS 
ORDER OF SUBSTITUTION 
Consolidated Case No. 080401531 
Judge Samuel D. McVey 
United Western Bank's ("UWB") Motion for Substitution came before the Court for 
consideration. The Court having considered UWB's motion, the memorandum and evidence 
submitted in support thereof and the file in this matter, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby 
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that UWB's Motion for Substitution is GRANTED. 
Accordingly, UWB is hereby substituted in the place and stead of defendant Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation for all purposes in the above-captioned consolidated actions. 
DATED on this [V day of Jvv*- ,2010. 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TIM RISINGER%b/a MARATHON TRIADS 
CARPET MILL OUTLET, 
Plaintiff, 
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MIDTOWN JOINT VENTURE, LC, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
AND CONSOLIDATED ACTIONS 
'i 
i. 1 
ORDER OF SUBSTITUTION 
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First-Citi&ens Bank & Trust Company's ("FCB") Ex Parte Motion for Substitution came 
before the Court for consideration. The Court having considered FCB's motion, the evidence 
v y 
submitted in support thereof and the file in this matter, and for good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that FCB's Motion for Substitution is GRANTED. 
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Accordingly, FCB is hereby substituted in the place and stead of defendant United Western Bank 
for all purposes in the above-captioned consolidated actions. 
DATED on this £ 2~~ day of fch ,2011. 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
'honorable Samuel D, McVey \, 
y 
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Appellees' Citiation of Non-Record Evidence 
The following table identifies every instance in which the Lien Claimants cited 
evidence not found in the record in their Brief of Appellees. Each instance of the Lien 
Claimants' citation of non-record evidence is identified by the page and footnote number 
of the Brief of Appellees on which the citation occurs. 
Page number 
of Appellees' 
Brief 
8-9 
8-9 
9 
9 
9 
10 
11 
11 
11 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
12 
13 
13 
13 
13 
13 
20 
20 
30 
30 
Footnote 
number 
12 
12 
13 
13 
13 
14 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
24 
25 
26 
26 
27 
28 
29 
29 
29 
31 
31 ' 
38 
38 
56 
56 
Non-record evidence cited 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibits 181, 182 & 190 
Deposition Exhibits 96 & 190 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition of Brett Harris, page 115 
Deposition Exhibits 96 & 165 
Deposition Exhibits 181, 184, 186, 187, 189 & 193 
Deposition Exhibit 181 1 
Deposition Exhibit 183 
Deposition Exhibit 182 1 
Deposition Exhibits 184, 185, 186 & 187 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 42 
Deposition Exhibits 187 & 188 
Deposition Exhibits 184, 185, 186 & 187 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 42 
Deposition Exhibit 188 1 
Deposition Exhibits 185, 186, 187 & 188 
Deposition Exhibits 181 & 193 
Deposition of Allen Washburn, page 91 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 120 
Deposition Exhibits 115, 181, 189 & 193 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, pages 91 & 120 1 
Deposition Exhibit 190 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibits 181, 182 & 190 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 | 
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| 30 
30 
31 
31 
31 
32 
32 
32 
32 
36 
36 
38 
38 
40 
40 
40 
40 
43 
44 
44 
44 
44 
45 
45 
46 
46 
46 
46 
46 
46 
46 
47 
47 
47 
47 
59 
59 
60 
6 1 J 
1 57 57 
58 
59 
59 
62 
62 
63 
63 
71 
71 
80 
80 
84 
84 
85 
85 
89 
91 
91 
93 
93 
95 
95 
98 
99 
100 
100 
101 
101 
102 
103 
103 
106 
106 
119 
119 
122 
Deposition Exhibits 96, 115 & 190 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibits 96 & 156 
Deposition Exhibit 190 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibit 147 
Deposition of Tod Wadsworth, page 86 
Deposition Exhibit 190 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibit 165 
Deposition of Adella Pearson, page 33 
Deposition Exhibit 190 1 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibit 190 1 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibit 165 1 
Deposition of Adella Pearson, page 33 1 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 95 
Deposition Exhibit 96 
Deposition of Brett Harris, page 115 1 
Deposition Exhibit 165 1 
Deposition of Adella Pearson, page 33 1 
Deposition Exhibit 165 1 
Deposition of Adella Pearson, page 33 1 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 95 1 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 95 
Deposition Exhibit 165 1 
Deposition of Adella Pearson, page 33 1 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 
Deposition Exhibit 190 1 
Deposition Exhibit 189 1 
Deposition Exhibit 165 1 
Deposition of Adella Pearson, page 33 1 
Deposition Exhibit 165 1 
Deposition of Adella Pearson, page 33 1 
Deposition Exhibit 194 1 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 136 1 
Deposition Exhibits 184, 186, 187 & 188 | 
125 1 Deposition Exhibits 184 & 186 | 
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1 62 
63 
63 
63 
65 
65 
6 5 
65 
66 
68 
71 
71 
71 
74 
75 
82 
130 
131 
132 
133 
139 
139 
140 
142 
146 
150 
160 
160 
161 
167 
170 
187 
Deposition Exhibit 181 
Deposition Exhibit 187 
Deposition Exhibit 18818 
Deposition Exhibits 181, 182, 184, 185, 186 & 187 
Deposition Exhibits 96, 154 & 15 8 
Deposition of Brett Harris, page 115 
Deposition Exhibit 180 
Deposition Exhibits 180 & 181 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 30 
Deposition of Allen Washburn, page 91 
Deposition Exhibit 190 
Deposition of Jim Krumm, page 102 \ 
Deposition of Allen Washburn, page 91 
Deposition Exhibits 180 & 181 
Deposition Exhibit 188 
Deposition Exhibits 96, 154 & 15 8 | 
18
 The Lien Claimants' contention that this deposition exhibit was attached to their Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is inaccurate. See 
Brief of Appellees, at p. 63 n.132. The exhibit was not attached to the memorandum. 
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